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Optimal Selectivity and Effort Cost
A Simple Bioeconomic Model with an Application
to the Bay of Biscay Nephrops Fishery
ClAIRE MAChER
Ifremer, UMR AMURE, Département d’Economie Maritime
JEAn BonCoEUR
Université de Brest, UEB, UMR AMURE
Petit poisson deviendra grand
Pourvu que Dieu lui prête vie; 
Mais le lâcher en attendant,
Je tiens pour moi que c’est folie
Car de le rattraper il n’est pas trop certain […]
Le petit Poisson et le Pêcheur, La Fontaine
Abstract   This article investigates the relationship between optimal gear selectivity 
and effort cost in the ishing industry. We irst show that optimal selectivity depends 
negatively on the level of effort cost, but that this relationship is not continuous. Op-
timal selectivity switches when real effort cost goes beyond a certain level, and this 
switch induces a non-marginal reduction in the level of ishing effort. In the second 
part of this article, we show that the current level of real effort cost in the nephrops 
ishery of the Bay of Biscay is far below the switch point, which makes high selectivity 
optimal. The discrepancy between optimal and current selectivity may be explained 
by the state of the ishery management and also by the fact that selectivity is hardly 
observable with the type of gear presently used.
Key words   Selectivity, effort, technical measure, management tradeoff, Nephrops 
ishery, Bay of Biscay, bio-economic model, social and private beneits and costs, 
fuel costs.
JEL Classiication Codes   Q22, Q57, H23. 
Introduction
So-called “technical measures,” aimed at increasing the selectivity of catches in the ish-
ing industry, are an important component of the standard isheries management toolbox 
(Suuronen and Sardà 2007). Several social beneits are expected from this increased 
selectivity (Pascoe and Revill 2004). The most widely acknowledged ones rely on the 
biological impact of selectivity measures. Selectivity has positive consequences on non-
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commercial species and on the biomass and age-structure of commercial stocks (Beverton 
and holt 1957; Kvamme and Fröysa 2004; Maclennan 1995; Salini et al. 2000; Stergiou 
et al. 1997; Suuronen and Sardà 2007; VanMarlen 2000; Ward 1994)1. Another important 
social beneit is due to the fact that rights-based systems of isheries management are 
easier to implement when ishing is selective; i.e., when unsought joint productions are 
minimized. Moreover, selectivity may generate some private beneits, such as minimizing 
time spent by crew sorting catches. 
 however, selectivity also generates costs that need to be considered when establish-
ing the policy-mix characterizing the management of a ishery. Apart from the possible 
higher price of selective gears, a major source of costs arises from the use of more selec-
tive gears, which often reduce catches of marketable ish per unit of effort (Fonseca et al. 
2005; Kvamme and Fröysa 2004; Madsen et al. 1999; Tschernij, Suuronen, and Jounela 
2004; VanMarlen 2000). This feature suggests that net beneits provided by selectivity 
depend on the level of ishing effort. 
 In this article, we address this issue with the help of a simple bioeconomic model, 
which we apply to the case of the French ishery of the Bay of Biscay. The model de-
scribes the harvesting of a commercial stock with a poorly selective gear (e.g., trawling). 
low selectivity usually results in jointly harvesting individuals belonging to several spe-
cies, and, for each species, individuals belonging to several size or age classes. In the 
model, we simplify this feature by assuming that only different age groups of the same 
species are jointly harvested. Increasing selectivity (e.g., by using larger mesh size) 
reduces catch per unit of effort (CPUE) for younger age groups, which are also charac-
terized by lower landings prices. The model allows computing the long-run beneits and 
costs of increasing selectivity for a given level of effort. It also makes it possible to deter-
mine the optimal policy-mix between effort and selectivity controls. 
 In the irst part of this article, we describe a simpliied version of the model with only 
two age groups. After presenting the assumptions of the model, we analyze the impact of 
increasing selectivity on equilibrium catches and landed values for a given level of ef-
fort. We then characterize the envelope curve representing landed value as a function of 
ishing effort, assuming optimal selectivity for each level of effort. Using this envelope 
enables the deinition of the optimal combination of selectivity and effort and to assess 
the impact of increased ishing costs on this combination.
 In the second part of this article, we apply an extended version of the model to a simpli-
ied representation of the French Nephrops ishery of the Bay of Biscay. We simulate the 
impact of an increase in fuel cost on the optimal level of ishing effort and optimal selectivity. 
 Concluding remarks are devoted to a comparison between simulation results, the 
current state of the ishery, and to the possibility of bridging the gap between private and 
social net beneits of selectivity.
Simpliied Theoretical Model
In this section, we present a simpliied version of the model, assuming the harvest is 
composed of only two age classes. This simpliication is aimed at presenting more clearly 
the basic mechanisms at work when increasing gear selectivity. The model is run under 
biological equilibrium conditions; i.e., assuming stabilized ish biomass for each age 
group in each case. As a result, expressions such as “increasing gear selectivity” are used 
here only for the sake of brevity; the analysis developed in this section is purely based on 
comparative static.
1 Possible genetic impacts due to selective harvesting of larger individuals have also been investigated (Jennings 
and Revill 2007; law 2000). however, these possible long-term effects are not yet fully supported by empirical 
evidence and will not be considered herein.
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Assumptions
We assume that a single stock composed of two age groups (i = 1, 2), is ished by a ho-
mogenous leet making use of a given ishing technique. Time unit is the ishing season, 
which may be equal to a year, or shorter. Fishing effort (E) is held constant over time (i.e., 
during the whole ishing season and from season to season). For each age group, CPUE 
is assumed to be proportional to the corresponding ish biomass. As a result, the rate of 
ishing mortality in each age group (Fi) is proportional to ishing effort, and hence is also 
constant over time:
 Fi = qiE     (i = 1,2), (1)
where qi ≥ 0 is the catchability coeficient concerning age group i. The value of this co-eficient is conventionally set at 1 for the older group (q2). For the younger group, it is deined as:
   
 q1 = 1 – s     (0 ≤ s ≤1),                                                    (2)
where s is a parameter characterising the selectivity of the ishing technique. If s is equal 
to one, ishing mortality for age group 1 is null, and the ishing technique is said to be 
fully selective, or, in short terms, selective. If s is lower than one, joint productions ap-
pear: ishing effort generates mortality for both age groups. Cases where 0 < s < 1 are 
described as situations of “imperfect selectivity.” The level of selectivity decreases as s 
gets closer to zero. When this parameter reaches zero, the rate of ishing mortality for 
age group 1 reaches the same level as for age group 2, and the ishing technique is called 
“non-selective.” For the sake of simplicity, we assume that changes in selectivity do not 
modify effort costs (e.g., the price and operating cost of a trawl are assumed to be inde-
pendent of mesh size). 
 Also for the sake of simplicity, changes in ish biomass owing to recruitment, indi-
vidual growth, and natural mortality are assumed to occur once a year, at the beginning 
of the ishing season. Annual recruitment is exogenous.2 We assume that it is constant and 
conventionally set the level of yearly recruited biomass at 1. When the stock is not ished, 
changes in biomass between age groups 1 and 2 are due to individual growth and natural 
mortality. We use a single positive parameter, a, to represent the combined impact of 
these two factors: a is equal to the biomass of age group 2 at the beginning of the ishing 
season, assuming age group 1 is not ished. It is larger than 1 if the impact of individual 
growth overrides the impact of natural mortality, and smaller than 1 in the reverse case. 
 All catches are supposed to be landed and marketed. Unit-cost of effort (c) and 
ex-vessel unit-prices (pi) for landings of individuals of each age group (i = 1, 2) are exog-enous, positive, and constant. We assume that:
   
 p2a > p1. (3)
(Should this condition not be satisied, non-selective ishing would be optimal in any case.)
2 The exogenous character of recruitment is a questionable assumption in a model where spawning stock 
biomass (SSB) is endogenous. However, in many real-world isheries, no statistically signiicant relationship 
between SSB and recruitment may be drawn from available data, which may be explained by the reproduc-
tive strategy of a large class of marine commercial (and non-commercial) species. As a result of this strategy, 
recruitment depends much more on environmental (e.g., hydroclimatic) conditions that prevailed during the 
prerecruitment stage than on the number of genitors (Chambers 1997; Hilborn and Walters 1992; ICES 2006, 
2008). This feature, which fully applies to the stock used as a case study in the second part of this article, makes 
the simplifying assumption of exogenous recruitment more acceptable.
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Impact of Selectivity on Catches
let (t = 0) be the beginning of the ishing season and Xi(t) the biomass of age group i (i = 
1, 2) at time t of the ishing season. Since the only factor of variation of this biomass dur-
ing the ishing season is ishing mortality, the instantaneous rate of which is held constant, 
we can write:
 Xi(t) = Xi(0)e
–q
i
Et     (i = 1,2). (4)
 The volume of catches over age group i during the whole season is given by:
 Yi = Xi(0) – Xi(1) = Xi(0)(1– e–qiE)     (i = 1,2). (5)
 let us now consider this function separately for each age group and assess the impact 
of a change in the selectivity parameter on the corresponding catches.
 For age group 1, Xi(0) is equal to recruited biomass, conventionally set at 1, and the catchability coeficient is given by relationship (2). Therefore, the above equation becomes:
 Y1 = 1 – e
–(1–s)E.                                                     (6)
 When ishing is selective (s = 1), catches of individuals belonging to age group 1 are 
null (Y1 = 0). With a selectivity coeficient lower than 1, catches of group 1 are an increas-ing and concave function of ishing effort, with an asymptotic level equal to recruited 
biomass as effort increases indeinitely. In this case, an increase in selectivity reduces 
catches of group 1 for any positive level of effort (igure 1).
Figure 1.  Catches of Age Group 1 as a Function of Fishing Effort for Different levels
of Selectivity s (arrows outline increasing selectivity)
 For age group 2, the catchability coeficient is conventionally set at 1, and the biomass 
at the beginning of the ishing season is equal to ae–(1–s)E. Therefore, equation (5) becomes:
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  Y2 = ae
–(1–s)E (1– e–E).                                                   (7)
 When ishing is selective, age group 1 is not harvested, and the biomass of age group 
2 at the beginning of the ishing season is equal to a. In this case, catches of age group 2 
are a monotonic increasing and concave function of ishing effort, with a as an asymptote 
when effort grows indeinitely (igure 2). With a selectivity coeficient lower than 1, the 
situation is more ambivalent, because an increase in ishing effort (under equilibrium 
conditions) has two opposite effects on catches of age group 2: a direct positive effect, 
symbolised by factor (1– e–E) in relationship (7), and an indirect negative effect, symb-
olised by factor ae–(1–s)E in the same equation. The latter is due to the fact that increasing 
ishing effort with a non-selective or an imperfectly selective gear induces a decrease in 
the volume of age group 1 biomass at the end of the ishing season and, as a result, in the 
volume of age group 2 biomass at the beginning of the next season. The direct positive 
effect is dominant for a low level of ishing effort, but once effort has gone beyond the 
following threshold:
   
  (8)
the indirect negative effect becomes dominant, and catches of age group 2 become a decreas-
ing function of ishing effort. These catches tend towards zero as effort increases indeinitely, 
because this implies that nearly all ish are caught at age 1 (“recruitment ishery”).
 The impact of an increase in selectivity on the relationship between effort and catches 
of age group 2 is depicted in igure 2. For any given level of effort, increased selectivity 
means increased catches of this group, because it lets a larger number of individuals reach 
age 2. Moreover, the level of effort corresponding to maximum catches of this age group 
increases (when s reaches 1; i.e., when ishing becomes fully selective, this level is ini-
nitely high. As noted before, catches of group 2 are a monotonic increasing function of 
effort if ishing is selective).
2
ln ,
1
s
E
s
 
Figure 2.  Catches of Age Group 2 as a Function of Fishing Effort for Different levels
of Selectivity s (arrow outlines increasing selectivity)
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Impact of Selectivity on Landed Value
The yearly landed value is deined as:
   
V = p1Y1 + p2Y2.                                                     (9)
 Combining this relationship with (6) and (7), we get:
 V = p1 (1– e–(1–s)E) + p2ae–(1–s)E (1– e–E). (10)
 For given levels of selectivity and prices, this equation expresses landed value as a 
function of ishing effort (igure 3).
Figure 3.  landed Value as a Function of Fishing Effort for Different levels
of Selectivity (arrows outline increasing selectivity)
 In the case of full selectivity (s = 1), only individuals of age group 2 are landed, and 
V is a monotonic increasing and concave function of E, tending towards p2a as ishing ef-fort increases indeinitely.
 If the selectivity coeficient is lower than 1, ishing generates joint productions, and V 
becomes a weighted means of catches of age groups 1 and 2. While the former is a mono-
tonic increasing function of ishing effort, we have seen that the latter is an increasing 
function of effort as long as ,E E  and becomes a decreasing function of effort beyond 
this level, with a zero asymptote as effort grows indeinitely. As a result, provided condi-
tion (3) holds, the relationship between E and V is not monotonic. For low levels of effort, 
V is an increasing function of E. It is maximum when E reaches:
   
 
2
2 1
2ˆ ln ln ,
1
p as
E
s p a p
                                             (11)
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 If effort grows beyond that point, landed value starts decreasing. It tends monotoni-
cally towards p1 when effort increases indeinitely, as catches concentrate on age group 1 (recruitment ishery). The maximum value of V:
 
  2 111 2 22 1ˆ( ) 1 ,2s ssspV E p p a p a s         (12)
is included between p1 and p2a, which are the two asymptotic values of V, respectively, when effort grows indeinitely with imperfect selectivity (or non-selectivity) and full selectivity.
 The way selectivity affects landed value varies according to the level of ishing ef-
fort. For low levels of effort, the negative impact of poor selectivity on the harvestable 
biomass of age group 2 is limited, and increasing selectivity merely results in decreased 
value of landings of age group 1. For higher levels of effort, the negative impact of poor 
selectivity on the harvestable biomass of age group 2 becomes more severe and may 
override its positive inluence on the landings of age group 1. Consequently, increasing 
selectivity may result in increasing total landed value. Differentiating (10) with respect 
to s shows that landed value is a decreasing function of selectivity for levels of effort that 
are lower than:
   
 E
~
  2
2 1
p a
ln
p a p
   (13)
and becomes an increasing function of selectivity with higher levels of effort. note that E
~
 , 
which is the level of effort resulting in V = p1, does not depend on s. In igure 3, the curve 
representing V(E) rotates counter clockwise around the point of coordinates (E~ , p1) as s is 
progressively increased from 0 to 1; i.e., as ishing technique evolves from non selectiv-
ity to full selectivity. During this evolution, the level of effort Eˆ  maximising V increases, 
and so does the corresponding maximum value. When s tends towards 1, Eˆ tends towards 
ininite, and ˆV( E ) tends towards p2a. According to the level of effort in the ishery, selectivity and effort may be regarded 
as complementary or substitutive factors. For effort levels under E
~
 , increasing selectivity 
reduces the value of landings ceteris paribus, but this effect may be offset by a simultane-
ous increase in effort; effort and selectivity may be considered as complementary. When 
effort is between E
~
  and Eˆ , landed value is an increasing function of both selectivity and 
effort, which may then be regarded as substitutes (an increase in one of these factors may 
be used to balance the consequences of a decrease in the other). If effort goes beyond Eˆ , 
effort and selectivity become complementary once again. Increasing effort reduces landed 
value, ceteris paribus, but increasing selectivity has the opposite effect, and may be used 
to offset the negative effect of a higher level of effort.
Landed Value Envelope Curve
We now describe the envelope curve representing landed value as a function of ishing ef-
fort, assuming the level of selectivity is optimal for each level of effort. let us name Vs(E) the relationship between ishing effort and landed value for a given level of selectivity s. 
For a given level of effort E, in a situation where no speciic cost is attached to selectivity, 
the best level of selectivity s*(E) is the one that maximises landed value. As a result, the 
envelope curve V*(E) is deined as:
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 ( ) ( ) ;
*
s
s
V E maxV E E                                              (14)
i.e., the relationship between effort and landed value, assuming that for each level of ef-
fort the selectivity that maximises landed value is adopted (this envelope is represented 
by the thick line in igure 3).
 As noted before, the sign of the partial derivative ∂V/∂s depends on the value of E. If 
E is lower than E
~
 , this derivative is negative, which implies that non-selectivity is optimal 
(s* = 0). When ishing effort is equal to E~ , ∂V/∂s is null. It becomes positive for values 
of E higher than E
~
 , which makes full selectivity optimal (s* = 1). Effort E
~
  is therefore the 
switch point where optimal technique changes from non-selectivity to full selectivity. In 
this model,  imperfect  selectivity  is never optimal,  except   possibly  at the  switch point 
E
~
 , where s* is undetermined (when E = E
~
 , landed value is independent of the level of s). 
Combining these results with (10), we get the following expression for the equation of the 
envelope curve:
    10 1 21 2( ) 1 for( ) ( ) 1 for( s )E Es* EsV E p p ae e EV E V E p a e E              E~                   (15)
 
The envelope curve is continuous and strictly increasing. When effort grows indeinitely, 
V*(E) tends asymptotically towards p2a. It is differentiable at any point and strictly con-
cave in the neighbourhood of any point, except E
~
 . The point of envelope V*(E) where  E 
= E
~
  is a sharp point (point G in igure 3), where the left-side derivative of V* with respect 
to E is lower than the right-side derivative (igure 4). 
E
~
 
.
Figure 4.  Derivative of the Envelope V*(E)
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Optimal Combination of Effort and Selectivity
The optimal combination of effort and selectivity in the ishery is the vector (E*, s*) that 
maximises the ishery rent under biological equilibrium conditions:
 π(s,E) = V(s,E) – cE.                                              (16)
 With the help of the envelope V*(E), this two-variable optimisation problem may be 
reduced to the following one-variable problem:
    Determine E ≥ 0
 
    such that: [V* (E) – cE] → max.
 If effort E* is optimal, it satisies the irst order condition:
 
*V
c.
E
   (17)
 According to this condition, optimal combination of effort and selectivity makes the 
marginal value of effort on the envelope curve equal to the unit cost of effort. however, 
due to the shape of the curve representing the relationship between ∂V*/∂E and E, two lo-
cal optima, both satisfying condition (17), may occur (see igure 4). This will happen if 
the unit-cost of effort belongs to the interval:
 
2
1
2 2 1
2
1 ,
p
p a c p a p
p a
                                      (18)
the lower and upper bounds of which are equal to the values of ∂V*/∂E for E = E~ , with the 
non-selective technique (s = 0), and with the selective technique (s = 1), respectively.
 If unit effort cost c belongs to the interval deined by (18), the overall optimum may 
be obtained by comparing rent levels for the two local optima. To this end, let us call 
“scenario I” the use of a non-selective ishing gear (s = 0), and “scenario II” the use of 
fully selective gear (s = 1). For each scenario, there is an optimal ishing effort ( , * *I IIE E ),
resulting in a maximum level of rent ( * *
I    II
). It may be shown that the optimal rent 
difference between the non-selective scenario and the selective scenario ( * *
I II ) is a 
continuously increasing function f of unit effort cost c (see Appendix). In other words, a 
high cost of effort favours the non-selective technique with respect to the selective tech-
nique. More speciically, as f(c) is negative for the lower boundary of interval (18) and 
positive for the upper boundary of the same interval, there is an intermediate value, c
~
, 
between these two boundaries, such that f(c
~
 ) = 0, with f(c) negative for c smaller than 
c
~
, and  f(c) positive for c larger than c
~ (igure 5). This result implies that scenario II (se-
lectivity) is more proitable as long as effort cost, c, is smaller than c~, while scenario I 
(non-selectivity) becomes more proitable once c has gone beyond c~. As a result, c~ is the 
switch point, in terms of effort cost, between the two techniques.  
 To illustrate the impact of effort cost on selectivity, let us irst suppose that c < c~, 
(igure 4). If the ishery is optimally managed, the technique in use is the selective one 
(scenario II, with s* = 1). A rise in c, due to an increase in fuel price (for example), will 
gradually reduce the optimal volume of effort E*, but will not alter the ishing technique 
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as long as the unit cost of ishing effort has not reached the switch point, c~. once this 
point is reached, the optimal technique shifts from selectivity to non-selectivity (scenario 
I, with s* = 0). This change of scenario at point c
~
 entails a non-marginal reduction of 
ishing effort, which is visualised in igure 4 by a “jump” from E*II  (c~ ) to E*I  (c~ ). A further 
increase in c would result anew in a gradual decrease in optimal effort, keeping the non-
selective technique in use (as long as c < p1 + p2a, which is the maximum level of effort cost consistent with a proitable activity; if c goes beyond this point, the optimal alterna-
tive is to stop ishing). 
 This very simple model suggests that rising ishing costs are likely to discourage the use 
of selective ishing gears. However, even within the oversimpliied framework of the model, 
it is clear that several factors may offset this tendency. one of them is a change in the struc-
ture of ex-vessel prices. It can be seen from the Appendix that a decrease in p1 relative to p2 
will move the curve representing f(c) downward, which, in turn, raises point c
~
  where f(c) = 0. 
As a consequence, the range of costs where selective ishing is optimal widens.
Figure 5.  optimal Rent Difference Between the non-selective and
Selective Technique as a Function of Effort Cost
Application to the Nephrops Trawl Fishery of the Bay of Biscay
In this section, we apply our model to a simpliied representation of the French Norway 
lobster (Nephrops norvegicus) trawl ishery of the Bay of Biscay (ICES VIIIa,b) (igure 
6). To this end, we extend the theoretical version that was presented in the former section. 
After a short presentation of the case study, we describe the applied version of our model 
and the scenarios that are run with its help. Finally, we present the simulation results.
Case Study
The Nephrops ishery is one of the most important isheries of the Bay of Biscay. In 2003, 
its turnover amounted to 33.2 million euros. The leet is composed of some 250 trawlers 
Optimal Selectivity and Effort Cost in Fisheries 223
(mainly twin-trawlers) most of them French3 and represents approximately 25% of the 
total number of trawlers operating in the area. In 2003, the average length of these boats 
was 15 meters, with an engine power of 235 kW, an average age of 19 years, and a yearly 
average of 200 days at sea (IFREMER 2005). A decrease in the number of vessels target-
ing Nephrops in the Bay of Biscay has been observed during the last decades, but it has 
been largely offset by increased ishing eficiency (Marchal et al. 2007). 
 The management of the ishery mainly relies on conservation measures: a total allow-
able catch (TAC) revised each year, a minimum landing size (MlS, 9 cm corresponding 
to Nephrops younger than age group 3), and a minimum trawl mesh size (70 mm). In re-
gards to access regulations, a limited entry license system has been enforced since 2005. 
however, it does not include individual limitations of effort or catches.
 The ishery is characterized by high levels of bycatch and discards (ICES 2006). Dis-
cards of Nephrops affect mainly small individuals. Respectively 96, 75, and 28% of the 
Nephrops catches of age groups 1, 2, and 3 (in weight) are discarded, with a minimum 
70% rate of mortality (Guéguen and Charuau 1975). Since 2000, ishers have developed a 
program intended to improve selectivity, with technical assistance from IFREMER. Several 
selective devices have been tested: square mesh panel to enable hake escapement, Nephrops 
grid, and mesh size increase. In 2005, the use of a square mesh panel became compulsory.
3 The French quota represents 94% of the annual TAC set by the EU.
Figure 6.  nephrops Fishery in ICES Divisions VIIIa,b
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Applied Model
Compared to the theoretical model presented in the irst part of this article, the applied 
model we use to analyse the case study provides a more realistic description of the ish-
ery. An extended bio-economic model of the Bay of Biscay Nephrops ishery is described 
in (Macher et al. 2008). Several groups of vessels are considered to differentiate between 
two ishing strategies (a Northern leet, targeting Nephrops most of the year, and a South-
ern leet, targeting Nephrops occasionally) and various cost structures linked to vessel 
length categories. The age-structured biological component describes the dynamics of 
the nine Nephrops age group. Discards are taken into account. For the sake of the pres-
ent application, a simpliied version of this model is considered. The main simpliications 
are that the Nephrops leet is described as a whole and that age-groups are aggregated 
into two main categories—“small Nephrops,” which correspond to age groups 1 to 4 
and “large Nephrops,” which correspond to age groups 5 to 9—to be better linked to the 
model described in the former part of the article. The model is comprised of three compo-
nents: biological, technical, and economic. Inputs are detailed in table 1. 
Table 1
Parameters of the Applied Model
Indices  
Small Nephrops Age Groups 1 to 4 1
larger Nephrops Age Groups 5 to 9+ 2
Stock Parameters  
Recruitment 354,041
a 0.7111
Mean weight (kg/individuals) 
w1 0.0139
w2 0.0432
Catches (tonnes) 
Y1  4,056
Y2  1,719
Discard Rate (% in weight)  
D1  37
D2 3
Catchability 
q1  3.6221E–05
q2 5.0167E–05
Price Parameters Euros/kg 
p1  7.4
p2  13.2
Fleet Parameters  
nb of vessels 237
Mean nb of days at sea per vessel 204
Nephrops gross revenue (millions euros) 41
Total gross revenue (GR) (millions euros) 85
landing costs (% of total GR) 5
Fuel costs (euros/days at sea) 225
Food costs (euros/days at sea) 31
Ice costs (euros/days at sea) 9
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 The biological component describes the Nephrops stock dynamics. Annual recruit-
ment is assumed to be constant as is mean weight per category.4 Stock, catches, discards, 
and catchability parameters were derived from the Nephrops ishery model results at 
equilibrium using 2004 stock assessment (ICES 2004). 
 The main features of the technical component may be described as follows. For 
each category, CPUE is assumed to be proportional to biomass, and catchability is held 
constant over time. Selectivity scenarios are assumed to modify catchability as described 
in the theoretical section. On the basis of ishing mortality, the model calculates catches, 
landings, and discards per category.5 
 In regards to the economic component of the model, the IFREMER isheries infor-
mation system provided cost data for the Nephrops leet (IFREMER 2005). Variable costs 
(fuel, ice, food, etc.) are assumed to be proportional to ishing effort. 
 Nephrops ex-vessel prices come from auction markets statistics. Annual mean prices 
are assumed to be exogenous and constant.6 Small Nephrops obtain a mean ex-vessel 
price of 7.2 euros/kg, and “large Nephrops” obtain a higher price (13.2 euros/kg). 
 Nephrops gross return is calculated from landings and prices. Revenues provided by 
species other than Nephrops are assumed to be constant. net gross return is equal to total 
gross return minus landing taxes. 
 According to the so-called “share system,” enforced in French small-scale isheries, 
the net return to be shared is obtained by subtracting so-called “shared costs” from boat 
net turnover (shared costs are those variable costs that may be isolated on a trip basis, 
such as fuel or ice).7 
Scenarios
The applied model is a simulation model, with exogenous levels of selectivity and effort. 
The model is it for explicit optimization and also enables us to test a variety of selectivity 
scenarios and to run simulations for each of them that cover a range of effort levels.
 Two scenarios have been designed. Both assume equilibrium conditions (comparative 
static). The irst scenario, denoted SI, assumes current selectivity. The second scenario, 
denoted SII, assumes a higher selectivity such that the catchability for age group 4 and 
younger age groups is null, while catchability for elder age groups remains unchanged 
(i.e., at the same level as in SI). This scenario implies that only individuals belonging to 
the “large Nephrops” commercial grade are caught. 
 As in the theoretical model, we assume that the only cost of greater selectivity is the 
decrease in catches of smaller individuals. 
 We irst analyse the potential impact of each scenario on the equilibrium gross 
revenue for various levels of effort. We then test the impact of a range of hypothetical in-
creases in effort cost on the relative proitability of these two scenarios in terms of return 
to be shared. 
4 The assumption of constant mean weight per age group disregards the potential impact of selectivity on growth 
parameters (Schirripa and Trexler 2000).
5 Some discards are motivated by legal considerations (when individuals under the minimum landing size are 
caught, they are required to be discarded). Technical and economic reasons also motivate discards, as sorting 
catches on the deck is a time-consuming and uncomfortable operation, which results in discarding some of the 
less valuable individuals. 
6 The exogenous character of landing prices is justiied by the fact that the ishery under survey provides only a 
minor part of the supply on the market for the considered species.
7 The net return to be shared is split into two parts, determined by a pre-established key, to obtain the crew and 
owner shares. 
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Simulations Results
Figure 7 (a,b) summarizes aggregated simulation results, assuming the current level of 
unit effort cost. Aggregated effort is normalized so that (mE = 1) corresponds to the mean 
level that was observed over 2001–2003 (“actual effort”).
Figure 7b.  Focus on the Switch Point Effort Area of the Equilibrium Gross Revenue 
(GR) as a Function of Selectivity (SI: non selective scenario, SII: selective scenario)
and Fishing Effort for Actual Prices and Costs
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Figure 7a.  Equilibrium Gross Revenue (GR) as a Function of Selectivity
(SI non selective scenario, SII: selective scenario) and Fishing Effort (expressed as a 
multiplication factor of the effort) for Actual Prices and Costs
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 According to our simulations, under the current level of effort (mE=1), scenario SII is 
optimal. For effort levels below the switch point (E
~ ) depicted in the irst section, scenario 
SI becomes the most proitable, while for any permanent level of effort beyond that point, 
scenario SII (where only individuals belonging to the higher commercial grade are caught) is the most proitable (Figure 7a,b). The effort corresponding to the switch point (E~ ) is 
approximately 7% of the present level. Analyses of the ishery return to be shared (RtbS) 
provided in igure 8 show that under scenario SI, the actual level of effort is too high, as-suming unchanged selectivity, a reduction in ishing effort by 40% could raise the RtbS 
by 50%. Under scenario SII, RtbS is maximised with an effort 60% higher than the cur-
rent one, and the simulations suggest that it could be 5% higher than it is now. Improving 
selectivity could be proitable to the ishery without requiring a reduction in ishing effort.
 In order to check the impact of effort cost on optimal selectivity, a range of increase 
in fuel price was simulated (table 2). In this simulation, scenarios SI and SII were run as-
suming a fuel price multiplier of the average 2001-2003 price level. An increase would 
naturally impact ishery rent negatively for all levels of effort scenarios. The results show 
that SI becomes optimal only for very high fuel price increases. Assuming best selectivity, 
increasing fuel cost tends to reduce the optimal effort level. however, possible fuel cost 
increases would lead to optimal effort levels still signiicantly beyond the switch point, 
and, as a result, the best selectivity scenario would still be SII. Associating the rise in fuel 
price with a change in the relative price of large and small Nephrops could change this 
situation. As demonstrated in the appendix, such a change modiies the level of unit effort 
cost that induces a shift in optimal selectivity. 
Figure 8.  Equilibrium Fishery Total Return to be Shared (RtbS) as a Function
of Selectivity and Fishing Effort for Actual Prices and Costs
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Conclusion
The simple theoretical model presented in the irst part of this article highlights the fact 
that optimal selectivity depends on ishing effort and, therefore, on prices and costs. One 
of the conclusions that can be drawn from the model is that, assuming an optimally man-
aged ishery, higher ishing effort costs favour lower selectivity. However, this process is 
not continuous. As long as unit cost of effort is kept below a critical level, the hierarchy of 
techniques remains unaltered. It reverses beyond this level, which acts as a switch point. 
This technical switch goes with a non-marginal reduction in the level of optimal effort.
 The second part of the article presented an empirical application of the model to the 
Nephrops ishery of the Bay of Biscay. According to the simulations that were run, the 
current state of the ishery is far from optimal in terms of effort, as well as selectivity. 
Keeping selectivity unchanged, rent could be increased by signiicantly decreasing effort, 
but the increase in rent could be even higher if selectivity was increased, and this would 
not necessarily require a decrease in global effort. 
 With respect to present conditions, simulations also suggest that reaching the techni-
cal switch point would require a very high increase in effort costs. At irst sight, this result 
may be regarded as a paradox when considering the current state of the ishery, since the 
current technique appears to be the least proitable one, even with provision for signii-
cantly increasing fuel costs. The explanation is twofold. First, the ishery is not optimally 
managed in terms of effort. Second, costs and beneits of selectivity do not belong to the 
same category. While the former are purely private, the latter are mainly social; i.e., op-
erate at the scale of the ishery, not at the scale of the individual isher. It is true that this 
discrepancy is not speciic to selectivity; being rooted in the common-pool nature of the 
ish stocks, it also concerns ishing effort. However, it is likely to be more acute with se-
lectivity than with effort for two reasons; while decreasing effort normally reduces social 
costs, it also reduces private costs, although to a lesser degree.
 Contrasting with this situation, the beneits of increasing selectivity are in most cases 
purely social; the probability that an individual isher catches a large ish which he re-
frained from catching when it was small is close to zero. This problem is often worsened 
by the fact that under many circumstances current selectivity is non-observable. It makes 
it relatively easy to circumvent apparent improvements in selectivity (e.g., grids, change 
in mesh size or shape). 
Table 2
Impact of a Range of Increase in Fuel Cost on the optimal level
of Fishing Effort and optimal Selectivity
Fuel Cost Multiplier mE* Smax RtbS max
1 1.628 SII 247
5 1.017 SII 193
10 0.738 SII 146
15 0.573 SII 111
20 0.456 SII 83
25 0.364 SII 61
30 0.290 SII 43
35 0.226 SII 29
40 0.172 SII 18
45 0.123 SII 10
50 0.054 SI 5
55 0.038 SI 3
60 0.023 SI 1
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 This factor may powerfully boost temptations for individual ishers to act as free 
riders, making non-selective use of apparently selective techniques. A solution to this 
problem might be a drastic change in the type of gear; e.g., a shift from trawl to pot in 
the case of the Nephrops ishery. The private costs of such a change, which might seri-
ously decrease in the context of a long-term increase in fuel price, should be balanced by 
a thorough consideration of its social beneits, which are obviously broader than the ones 
considered in this article.
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Appendix
Optimal Proitability Gap between Non-selective and Selective Fishing as a 
Function of Unit Effort Cost
let πI and πII be the ishery rents when ishers use the non-selective technique and the 
selective technique, respectively. Combining (10) and (16) alternatively for (s = 0) and 
(s = 1), we get:
 πI = (p1 + p2ae–E)(1– e–E) – cE                                          (1a)
   
 πII = p2a(1 – e–E) – cE.                                                (2a)
 Maximising the rent for E in each scenario gives:
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 let us now express the difference between these two optimal rents as a function of 
unit effort cost:
   
           
* *
I II  = f (c). (5a)
 This function is deined, continuous, and differentiable over the whole interval de-
limited by (18). Combining (3a), (4a), and (5a) we get:
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 As this derivative is strictly positive, ( * *
I II ) is an increasing function of c. 
Moreover, when c is equal to the lower boundary of interval (18), this function has the 
following value:
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which is strictly negative. Symmetrically, when c is equal to the upper boundary of inter-
val (18), the same function has the following value:
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which is strictly positive. As a result, there is one and only one value c
~
 inside interval (18) 
such that f(c
~ ) = 0 (see igure 5). For any c lower than c~, f(c) is negative, which means than 
selective ishing is more proitable than non-selective  ishing. If c becomes  higher than
c
~
, f(c) is positive, which means than non-selective ishing is more proitable than selec-
tive ishing.
 The position of the curve representing f(c) on igure 5 depends on various param-
eters, including ex-vessel prices of each age group (p1, p2). The easiest way to analyse the inluence of the relative price of landings of these two groups on the relative proitability 
of the two ishing techniques is to consider the impact of a change in p1 on f(c), ceteris 
paribus. The partial derivative of ( * *
I II ) with respect to p1 is:
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 This expression is strictly positive, which implies that a rise in p1 will increase f(c) 
for any value of c belonging to interval (18). As a result, the curve representing f(c) in ig-
ure 5 will move upward, and point c
~
  where this curve crosses the horizontal axis (f(c) = 
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0) will move to the left. An increase in p1, ceteris paribus, narrows the range of effort cost where the selective technique is more proitable than the non-selective one. The opposite 
result is obtained in the case of a decrease in p1.
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